skip to main content
US FlagAn official website of the United States government
dot gov icon
Official websites use .gov
A .gov website belongs to an official government organization in the United States.
https lock icon
Secure .gov websites use HTTPS
A lock ( lock ) or https:// means you've safely connected to the .gov website. Share sensitive information only on official, secure websites.


Search for: All records

Creators/Authors contains: "Hajiaghayi, MohammadTaghi"

Note: When clicking on a Digital Object Identifier (DOI) number, you will be taken to an external site maintained by the publisher. Some full text articles may not yet be available without a charge during the embargo (administrative interval).
What is a DOI Number?

Some links on this page may take you to non-federal websites. Their policies may differ from this site.

  1. We here address the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods or chores to n agents with weights that define their entitlement to the set of indivisible resources. Stemming from well-studied fairness concepts such as envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) and envy-freeness up to any good (EFX) for agents with equal entitlements, we present, in this study, the first set of impossibility results alongside algorithmic guarantees for fairness among agents with unequal entitlements.Within this paper, we expand the concept of envy-freeness up to any good or chore to the weighted context (WEFX and XWEF respectively), demonstrating that these allocations are not guaranteed to exist for two or three agents. Despite these negative results, we develop a WEFX procedure for two agents with integer weights, and furthermore, we devise an approximate WEFX procedure for two agents with normalized weights. We further present a polynomial-time algorithm that guarantees a weighted envy-free allocation up to one chore (1WEF) for any number of agents with additive cost functions. Our work underscores the heightened complexity of the weighted fair division problem when compared to its unweighted counterpart. 
    more » « less
  2. In this paper, we generalize the recently studied stochastic matching problem to more accurately model a significant medical process, kidney exchange, and several other applications. Up until now the stochastic matching problem that has been studied was as follows: given a graph G= (V,E), each edge is included in the realized sub-graph of G independently with probability pe, and the goal is to find a degree-bounded sub-graph Q of G that has an expected maximum matching that approximates the expected maximum matching of G. This model does not account for possibilities of vertex dropouts, which can be found in several applications, e.g. in kidney exchange when donors or patients opt out of the exchange process as well as in online freelancing and online dating when online profiles are found to be faked. Thus, we will study a more generalized model of stochastic matching in which vertices and edges are both realized independently with some probabilities pv, pe, respectively, which more accurately fits important applications than the previously studied model. We will discuss the first algorithms and analysis for this generalization of the stochastic matching model and prove that they achieve good approximation ratios. In particular, we show that the approximation factor of a natural algorithm for this problem is at least 0.6568 in unweighted graphs, and 1/2+ε in weighted graphs for some constant ε >0. We further improve our result for unweighted graphs to 2/3 using edge degree constrained sub-graphs (EDCS). 
    more » « less